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Su  mni ary findings
The East Asian financial crisis has been attributed  in part  Investigate whether diversification in East Asia has
to the corporate diversification associated with the  hurt economic efficiency.
misallocation of capital investment toward less profitable  Their study tests the learning-by-doing and
and more risky business segments. Much anecdotal  misallocation-of-capital hypotheses related to the types
evidence to support this view has surfaced since the crisis  and degrees of diversification in East Asiar. countries.
but there was little discussion of it before the crisis.  Firms in Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand appear
Quite the contrary: The rapid expansion of East Asian  to have suffered significant negative effects of vertical
firms by entering new business segments was viewed as  integration on short-term performance;  the same
contribuiting to the East Asian miracle.  countries gained significant short-term benefits from
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang examine the  complementary expansion. The results suggest that the
efficiency of investment by diversified corporations  in  misallocation-of-capital hypothesis is appropriate for
nine East Asian countries, using unique panel data from  Korea and Malaysia; the learning-by-doing hypothesis
more than 10,000 corporations  for the pre-crisis period,  for Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand.
1991-96. They:  Firms in more developed countries succeed in
- Document the degree of diversification in the  vertically integrating and improve both short-term
corporate sector in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the  profitability and market valuation. Firms in more
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,  developed countries are ultimately more likely to benefit
Taiwan (China), and Thailand, countries that have  from such diversification (learn faster, to improve their
achieved enviable rates of economic growth over the past  performance). And diversification by firms in less
three decades.  developed countries is subject to more misallocation of
* Distinguish between vertical and complementary  capital.
diversification and study the differences across nine
countries.
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1.  Introduction
The East Asian financial crisis has at least in part been attributed to the extensive
diversification of corporates, which is associated with misallocation of capital investment
towards less profitable and more risky business segments. While a plethora  of anecdotal
evidence to support this argument has surfaced in the aftermath of the crisis, there was little
discussion  preceding  the crisis.  Quite  the opposite, the  rapid  expansion of  East Asian
corporations  through  entry  into  new  business  segments  was  seen  as  an  important
contributing  factor to  the  East Asian Miracle  (World  Bank  (1994)).  In  this  paper, we
examine  the  efficiency  of  investment  by  diversified  corporations  in  nine  East  Asian
countries, using unique panel data of more than 10,000 firns  over the 1991-96 pre-crisis
period.  We offer three contributions to  the literature. First, we document the degree of
diversification on the corporate sector in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, countries which have achieved enviable
rates of  economic growth over  the last three decades.  Second, we  distinguish between
vertical  and  complementary  diversification  and  study  the  differences  across  the  nine
countries. Finally, we investigate whether diversification  in East Asia has hurt  economic
efficiency.
To  accomplish the first two  contributions, we use  the inter-industry  commodity
flow data  in  the US  input-output  table  as  a  common  benchmark  to  construct  vertical
relatedness and complementarity indices between the primary and the secondary businesses
of all sample firms in the nine countries (see Fan, Lang and Stulz (1998)). These measures
allow us to describe, for any pairs of businesses, the possibility of vertical integration, joint
procurement, and/or sharing marketing and distribution  in  each firm. We document  the
degree  of  diversification  in  the  corporate  sector,  distinguish  between  vertical  and
complementary diversification, and study the differences across the nine countries.We  use  two  competing  hypotheses  to  help  answer  the  third  question.  The
misallocation-of-capital  hypothesis  states that  diversified  firms  allocate  capital  to  less
profitable segments. The more diverse and complex the investment opportunities available,
the  more  pronounced  this  misallocation  is.'  Such  misallocation  of  capital  should  be
associated with  a reduction  of short-term profitability  and  a pronounced diversification
discount. In contrast, the learning-by-doing hypothesis argues  that when  firms diversify
into new lines of business, there is an initial period during which labor is learning how to
use the new technology, and a reduction in short-term profitability should be observed. 2
This learning-by-doing should not be associated, however, with a diversification discount
since the forward-looking capital market fairly assesses the increase in profitability over
time as the learning-by-doing pays off.  We test these hypotheses by separating vertical and
complementary  diversification.  Since  vertical  diversification  is  more  complex  in
technology, management, and capital investment than complementary diversification (and
thus involves more possibilities  for misallocation of  capital and  learning-by-doing), we
should observe  a more pronounced effect on short-term profitability  and diversification
discount in vertical diversification than in complementary diversification. 3
Our  East  Asian  sample  allows  us  to  effectively  test  these  two  competing
hypotheses. First, some governments in the region have encouraged corporations to engage
in vertical expansion to upgrade technology and general level of development (see World
Bank (1998)).  Since this is not a pure market-outcome, it may be more likely to  find a
differential effect of vertical integration and complementary diversification  for countries
with  heavy  intervention such  as  South Korea  than  for countries  undertaking  a  natural
transition into diversified businesses.  Second, the nine East Asian countries are at different
levels  of  development,  which  provides  insights  into  the  link  between  diversification
patterns  and outcomes  and  the general  level  of economic development. 4 This  diversity
' See  Shin and Stulz  (1996),  Scharfstein  (1997),  and  Rajan, Servaes,  and Zingales  (1997).
2 See  Stockey  (1991) and  Young  (1993).
3 See  discussion  of vertical  integration  in Williamson  (1971)  and Klein,  Crawford  and Alchian  (1978).
4 In particular,  the nine countries  can be thought  of as a V-formation  with  Japan at the lead, flanked  by Hong
Kong, Singapore and  Taiwan, then  South Korea, Malaysia and finally Thailand, Indonesia and  the
Philippines.
2allows  us  to  test  the  differential  effect  of  vertical  integration  and  complementary
diversification by level of development. 5
We  find  that  Indonesia,  South  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Thailand  have  suffered
significant negative impact of vertical integration on profit margins, while the same four
countries have seen significant benefits from complementary expansion on profit margins.
In contrast, the diversification discount results suggest that the negative impact of vertical
diversification  only  remains  for  South  Korea  and  Malaysia.  It  suggests  that  the
misallocation of capital is more pronounced in South Korea and possibly Malaysia than in
Indonesia, Taiwan and Thailand, while the learning hypothesis  is more pronounced for
these three countries.
The diversity of economic development in our East Asian samples allows  us to
further examine these two hypotheses  by  investigating the  link between  diversification
effects and the level of economic development of a country. We would  expect that the
learning  and  capital  misallocation  problems  are  sensitive  to  the  degree  of  economic
development of the country to which a firm belongs. Consistent with the learning-by-doing
hypothesis, firms in more developed countries are successful in vertically integrating with
lower costs to both short-term profitability and market valuation since they already make
use of sophisticated technologies and may have peer firms to learn from. In contrast, firms
in less developed countries benefit more from complementary diversification, but firms in
more developed countries are more likely to ultimately benefit from such diversification.
This  is  also  consistent  with  the  learning-by-doing  hypothesis  where  firms  in  more
developed countries go faster up their learning curves and improve their performance. We
also find evidence consistent with the misallocation-of-capital hypothesis, as diversification
by  firms  in  less  developed  countries  is  subject to  more misallocation  of  capital.  Our
evidence supports  the finding in Shin and Stulz (1996) that internal capital markets play a
more important  role in  less developed  countries,  however  the  internal  capital markets
misallocate capital.  On the other hand, capital misallocation is less relevant to firms in
more developed countries, as there is no evidence of a pronounced diversification discount
for firms in more developed countries.
For example, Japan is the  most developed country, for example, vertical  integration should involve less
costs of misallocation of capital and leaming-by-doing than the other countries.
3The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the main findings of the
recent literature on diversification and provides motivation for our hypotheses.  Section 3
describes the data sample. Section 4 provides some simple comparisons between  single-
segment and multi-segment firms. Section 5 details the construction of the main variables
in testing  the misallocation-of-capital and  the learning-by-doing hypotheses.  Section 6
studies the links between the general level of economic development of a country and the
effect of diversification on the performance. Section 7 concludes.
2.  The Literature on Diversification and Efficiency of Investment
There  is  a  growing  body  of  literature,  which  investigates  the  impact  of
diversification on the market valuation of firms. Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek
(1995), Comment and  Jarrell (1995), and Servaes (1996), among others,  document that
diversified US firms trade at discounts relative to single-segment firms. Similar studies are
also conducted by Khanna and Palepu (1996), Lins and Servaes (1998), Fauver, Houston,
and Naranjo (1998) and Doukas and Lang (1998) for diversified firms in a cross-section of
developed and developing countries.
In  examining the  efficiency of  investment by  diversified  firms,  several  authors
argue that  diversified  firms allocate their  capital to  less profitable  segments. The more
diverse investment opportunities available, the more pronounced this misallocation.  Shin
and  Stulz  (1996)  argue  that  non-core  segments of  diversified  firms  invest  more than
specialized firms in the same industry when other segments do well and invest less when
they do poorly.  Their evidence is consistent with the view that the investment policy of
segments within firms differs from that of similar specialized firms.  Scharfstein (1997)
examines  investment  patterns  across  segments in  diversified  firms  and  concludes  that
diversified firms  appear to practice some  form of  suboptimal "socialist"  reallocation of
resources  across divisions,  moving funds from profitable firms  in  high  Q industries to
support  investment in lower  Q sectors.  Rajan,  Servaes, and  Zingales  (1997)  find that
diversified firms misallocate investment funds.  The extent of misallocation is positively
related to the diversity of investment opportunities across divisions;  and the discount at
which these diversified  firms trade is positively  related to  the extent of  the investment
misallocation and  the diversity of the  investment opportunities  across  divisions. Denis,
4Denis and Sarin (1997) argue that these value-reducing investment strategies are sustained
over time because they benefit management, but  a competitive corporat.e control market
may act as a disciplining tool.  The ineffective corporate control market in the mid-1980s
has exacerbated this inefficiency (Jensen (1986, 1989)).
The  misallocation-of-capital  argument  is  complementary  to  the  observation  by
Stockey  (1991)  and  Young  (1993)  who  argue  that  when  firms  diversify  into  new
businesses, the diversification is associated with a temporarily lower level of profitability
as the firm is learning to use the new technology.  If the capital is used for advantageous
economic activity, however, profitability should recover over time. Young (1992,  1995)
has applied the learning-by-doing hypothesis in the diversification  context of East Asia,
examining the patterns of corporate growth in Hong Kong and Singapore. He finds that as
firms diversify into less related businesses, they require more time  to adapt to  the new
technology  (see  also Kim  and Lau (1994) and Krugman (1994)).  Since corporations in
Singapore are given incentives by the government to rapidly move into more technology-
intensive sectors, they can seldom reach a sufficient level of learning before embarking on
a new venture.
A third literature is related to the internal capital market of diversified firms.  When
external capital  markets  are  more  costly to  use,  firms  allocate  their  capital  internally
through diversification (Williamson (1971), Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Lamont
(1997),  Stein  (1997),  Scharfstein  and  Stein  (1997)  and  Scharfstein  (1998)).  Fauver,
Houston, and Naranjo (1998) find that diversified firms perform better  when the capital
markets and the legal systems of their country are less developed.  Following the internal
capital  market  hypothesis,  diversification  within  firms  is  an  efficient  response  to  the
distortions in the external environments or weak external financial markets.  However, as
argued by  Shin and Stulz (1996), internal capital markets may  lead to  misallocation of
capital due to the heterogeneous and complex investment opportunities across the segments
of the firms.
53.  The Data
We study corporate diversification in nine countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, South
Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 6 Our primary data
source is the Worldscope database. Worldscope contains financial and segment informnation
on companies  from 49  countries.  The database  has been used  in  several  international
studies of corporate diversification  (Lins and Servaes  (1997) and Fauver,  Houston, and
Naranjo (1998)).
We initially  selected all companies from the nine countries covered  by the June
1991-1998 CD-Rom  version  of  annual  Worldscope  database.  In  each  of  the  annual
database, Worldscope provides historical financial data.  We are able to assemble several
years of financial data for most of the companies.  Historical segment data for many of the
companies  are  missing,  however,  since  Worldscope  reports  only  the  latest  available
segment  data.  To  increase  sample  size,  we  collected  additional  segment  data  for
Worldscope  companies  from  the  autumn  edition  of  the  1994-1998  Asian  Company
Handbook and Japan Company Handbook.  All financial data were converted to US dollars
using fiscal year end foreign exchange rate for each firm.
In  order  to  determine  the  types  of  the  companies'  businesses,  we  group  the
companies'  segments according to  the two-digit  Standard Industry  Classification  (SIC)
system.  This procedure involves two steps.  In the first step, we assign the four-digit SIC
codes reported by Worldscope to  appropriate segments.  In many cases  we are able to
obtain one-to-one matches between SIC codes and segments.  For some companies, the
number of reported SIC codes is not the same as the number of reported segments.  If a
segment can not be associated with a reported SIC code, we determine the segment's  SIC
code according to its business description. If a segment is associated with multiple SIC
codes, it is broken down equally so that each segment is associated with one SIC code. In
the second step, we redefine segments at the two-digit SIC level and aggregate segment
sales to that level.
We classify firms as single-segment if at least 90 percent of their total  sales are
derived from one two-digit SIC segment.  Firms are classified as multi-segment if they
6 Although China is also an interesting case, we can locate only a handful public firms from Worldscope. The
dominant corporate units in China are state-owned enterprises.  The few publicly traded firms are far from
representative of the census of firms in China.
6operate in more than one two-digit SIC code industries and none of their two-digit SIC
code segments accounts for more than 90 percent of total firm sales. 7 This classification
scheme is the same as in Lins and Servaes (1996, 1997) and Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo
(1998). We further define the primary  segment of a  multi-segment  firm as the  largest
segment by sales.  The remaining segment(s) are defined  as secondary segments.  In a
small number of cases two largest segments have identical sales.  In such cases we select
the segment with  the lower two-digit  SIC code as the primary  segment. Note  that  our
empirical results generally hold if the altemative is chosen as the primary segment.
Following  Lins  and  Servaes  (1997,  1998)  and  Fauver,  Houston,  and  Naranjo
(1998), we exclude multi-segment firms from the sample when they do not report segment
sales.  We also exclude firms whose primary business segment is financial services (SIC
6000-6999).  This selection results in a sample described in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
There are 8,450 (65%) multi-segment firms and 4,625 (35%) single-segment firms
in the sample.  Japanese firms comprise the majority of the sample, as they account for 75
percent of the multi-segment firmns  and 68 percent of the single-segment firms.  Across the
nine countries, Singapore and Malaysia rank high in the percentage of multi-segment firms
(72 and  70 percent,  respectively),  while Thailand and  the  Philippines  have the  lowest
percentage (27 and 33 percent, respectively).
The average size of multi-segment firms is US$2,371  million in total  assets and
US$1,776 million in total assets for single-segment firms.  Across the nine countries, the
average assets of multi-segment firms are mostly larger than those of single-segment firms,
with the exception of South Korea and Singapore.  Of the multi-segment  firms, Japanese
fims  have the largest average assets (US$2,850 million), followed by Korean and Hong
Kong firms.  Of the single-segment firms, Korean firms have the largest average assets
(US$2,250 million), followed by Japanese and Hong Kong firms.
7We  also  use 80% cut-off  as a robustness  check. The qualitative  results  do not change.
74.  Construction  of the Main  Variables
4.1 Short-term Performance
To  examine the hypothesis  by  Shin and  Stulz (1996)  that investment policy  of
segments in diversified firms differs from that of similar specialized firms, we employ the
"chop-shop" procedure of Lang and Stulz (1996) to construct our short-term and long-term
performance measures. In addition to adjust for sectoral differences  in performance, the
measures can be interpreted as the performance of a multi-segment firm relative to single-
segment firms in  its industries.  These measures allow us to  compare  the performnance
differences between multi-segment  (diversified) and  single-segment (focused)  firms and
associate the perfornance  differences with their different investment strategies.
We measure a firm's short-term performance by its profit margin, calculated as one
minus the costs of goods sold over sales. We first use the sub-sample of single-segment
firns  in each country to compute the median profit margin  for each two-digit SIC code
industry. We then multiply the sales share in each segment of a firm by the corresponding
industry median profit margin.  We sum the sales-weighted profit margin across segments
to obtain the imputed profit  margin of the firm. Lastly, we  subtract the imputed  profit
margin from the actual profit margin to obtain the industry-adjusted excess profit margin
(EPM). 8
In the computation of  industry median profit margin,  we restrict  the number of
single-segment firms to be at least three. In some cases, we do not have sufficient number
of firms to compute the median profit margin. In these cases, we use the median profit
margin of broader industry groups as defined by Campbell (1996). This procedure avoids
the  loss of  observations. Table 2  compares the differences  in the  excess  profit margin
measures between single- and multi-segment firms. Overall, multi-segment  firms are less
profitable than single-segment firms. The difference in mean and median EPM between the
multi-  and single-segment firms is negative and  statistically significant at the  1-percent
level.
[Table 2 here]
The  excess  profit  margin  is more  appropriate  than  other  accounting  income  variables  for  the  purposes  of this
study,  since  it is perfectly  correlated  with  average  variable  cost (defined  as 1  - profit margin)  which  is widely
used by micro  economists  to proxy  factor  productivity  changes  (see,  for example,  Young  (1992) and Clerides,
Lach  and Tybout  (1998)).
8In most  of the nine countries, multi-segment  firms are less profitable than their
single-segment counterparts.  As  in  Table 2, multi-segment  firms  in  seven  of the nine
countries exhibit lower mean (median) EPM and the differences in means (medians) are
statistically significant in four (seven) countries. Multi-segment firms in Indonesia and the
Philippines  appear  to  have  higher  EPM, but  the  mean  difference  is  not  statistically
significant, while the median difference is only significant for the Philippines.
4.2 Relatedniess
We  use  two  variables  to  capture  the  degree  of  relatedness  (vertical  and
complementary) between  the primary  and secondary segments  of a  firm.  The vertical
relatedness  variable  measures  the  degree  to  which  a  firm  integrates  forward  and/or
backward into its secondary segment(s), given its primary segment. For example, if a car
manufacturer takes over  a  car upholstery business, this  would  reflect a  high  backward
vertical  relatedness.  If,  in  contrast,  an  electricity  generation  company  takes  over  an
electricity distribution business, this would reflect a high forward vertical relatedness. The
complementarity  variable measure the  degree to  which  the primary  and  the  secondary
segments  complement  each  other  (forward)  in  marketing  and  distribution  and/or
(backward) in procurement.  An example of forward complementarity is a peanut butter
producer taking over (or expanding into) strawberry jelly production - the two products do
not use the same inputs, and are not vertically related, but that use the same distributors and
marketing agents. An example of backward complementarity would be merging together a
gin producer and an aspirin producer, as they both use glass containers for their products.
To  ensure consistency  across countries  and to  provide a  common benchmark,  the two
variables are constructed from information in the US input-output tables. 9
The procedure  for constructing the variables  is detailed in  Fan,  Lang and  Stulz
(1998).  It entails three steps.  First, we create four matrices of inter-industry relatedness
coefficients.  This  involves computing  the coefficients between  each pair  of  over  400
industries defined in the input-output tables.  We follow an approach similar to Lemelin
(1982) in measuring inter-industry relatedness.  The building block of this approach is the
Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark U.S. Input-Output Accounts. 10 The Use Table reports
9  We are unable  to obtain  input-output  tables  for individual  Asian  countries.
'° The Accounts  reports commodity  flows between  pairs of over 400 non-governnent and non-household
industries.  See Lawson  (1997)  for details.
9for each pair of industries i and j the dollar value of i's  output required to produce industry
j's  total output, denoted as Vij.  We divide Vij by the dollar value of industry j's  total
output to get vij, representing the dollar value of i's  output required to produce one dollar
worth  of industry j's  output.  When vij is  large, it suggests  a high  degree  of forward
integration of i into j.  Conversely, vji measures the dollar value of j's  product required by
industry i to  produce one  dollar worth of its output.  When vji is large,  it suggests an
opportunity for i to backward integrate into j.  We therefore define two vertical relatedness
coefficients,  FVRij=vij  and  BVRij=vji,  to  proxy  for  the opportunity  for  industry  i  to
forward and backward integrate into industry j, respectively.
From the Use Table, we compute  for each industry i the percentage of its output
supplied to each industry k, denoted as cik.  For each pair of industry i and j,  we compute
the simple correlation coefficient between cik and cjk across all k.  A large correlation
coefficient  in the percentage  output flows suggests a  significant overlap  in markets  to
which  industry  i  and j  sell their products.'  For each pair of  industry  i and j,  we also
compute a simple correlation coefficient across industry input structures between the input
requirement coefficients vik and vjk of the two industries.  A large correlation coefficient
suggests a significant overlap in inputs required by industries i andj.  We hence define two
complementarity coefficients, FCOMij = corr(cik, cjk) and BCOMij = corr(vik, vjk),  to
proxy for the degree of forward and backward complementarity between industries i and j,
respectively.  Trade between I and j  is excluded  from the correlations. In step one, the
subscripts for FVR, BVR, FCOM, and BCOM are small i and j which denote 400x400
industries.
In  the  second  step,  we  condense  the  relatedness  coefficient  matrices  to
accommodate the  widely used  SIC codes  and  reduce  400  industries  to  a  manageable
number.  This involves classifying the industries into 34 industry  groups and computing
mean relatedness coefficients by pairs of industry groups.  For each pair of the 34 industry
groups,  we  compute  mean  relatedness  coefficients  across  pairs  of  industries  that  are
classified into the same 34 pairs of industry groups.  This results in four 34x34 matrices of
mean relatedness coefficients.
'This coefficient  is not  used  in the  Lemelin  (  1982)  study.
10In the third step, we construct the relatedness variables for each multiple-segment
firms  in  our  sample  based  on  the  mean  relatedness  coefficients  from  the  condensed
matrices. We define the vertical relatedness and the complementarity variables as follows.
V = Zk(wk*FVRkIJ)  +  Yk(W  k*BVRkIJ),  and
C  =  Yk(W k*FCOM kIJ)  +  Zk(Wk*BCOMkiJ),
where wk is the sales weight equal to the ratio of the kih secondary segment assets to the
total assets of all secondary segments; FVRkIJ, BVRkIJ, FCOMkIJ, and BCOMkIJ are the
four mean related coefficients associated with industry group I and J to which the primary
and the secondary segments belong.
[Table 3 here]
In Table 3, we rank multi-segment firms by their relatedness levels, group the firms
into ten percentiles, and compute mean relatedness measures for each of the ten percentiles.
We focus on the 50'h (median) percentile.  The mean vertical relatedness is 0.0049 (Table
3, Panel A).  This implies that for every dollar worth of production by the firm, only 0.49
cent is potentially transacted in-house between the primary and secondary segments.  The
maximum in-house transaction is 10 cent per dollar worth of output, while the minimum is
zero.  Across  the nine countries,  the mean vertical  relatedness  of  the  50 percentile  is
highest for Thailand (0.0096), followed by Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (0.0031). This order does not correlate with the
degree of economic development.
Panel B of Table  3 reports mean complementarity measures by percentile.  The
mean complementarity  of the  50th percentile  is  0.3413.  The  maximum is  2 while the
minimum is close to zero.  Comparing the levels of the two relatedness measures, these
numbers suggest that the across-industry diversification by the Asian companies generate
more opportunities of sharing procurement and/or sales activities relative to the opportunity
of transacting input internally through vertical integration.  Across the nine countries, the
mean complementarity of the 5 0th percentile is the highest for Singapore (0.3991), followed
by  Hong Kong, Thailand, Japan,  South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan,  the Philippines,  and
Malaysia (0.2091). This order does not appear to correlate with the across-country order of
the vertical relatedness measure or the degree of economic development.
11To further examine the patterns of diversification by the firms, we report in Panel A
and B of Table 4 the distribution of firms by number and by cumulative percentage across
ten  different  levels of  the vertical  relatedness measure  V.  As  in  Panel  A and  B,  the
majority of the multi-segment firms falls into the category of V<0.01.  For the sample as a
whole, 5,298 (70%) of firms have their vertical relatedness measure below that level. The
number of firms decreases as V increases.  The pattern suggests that, for most of the firms,
there exist a small amount of transactions (less than 1 cent per dollar of output) between the
firms' primary and secondary segments.
[Table 4 here]
Across  the  nine countries,  Thailand  has  the  lowest  percentage  (50%)  of  firms
falling into the first category where V<0.01, followed in ascending order by Hong Kong,
Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (86%).  The
order is almost identical to the results presented in Table 3.  The order suggests that Thai-
firms have more vertically-related segments than firms in the eight other countries.  On the
other hand, Taiwanese multi-segment firms are the least vertically related.
Panel C and D of Table 4 present the distribution of firms across ten levels of the
complementarity measure C which indicates the possibility of sharing procurement or sales
activities.  In the sample as a whole, the majority (62%) of the multi-segment  firms falls
into the first four categories where C<0.4.  Using 0.4 as the cutoff level, the countries in
ascending order of the cumulative percentage are Singapore (50%), Hong Kong (52%),
Indonesia (59%), Thailand (60%), Japan (61%), Taiwan (73%), Philippines (75%), Korea
(76%),  and Malaysia  (77%).  The  order is  comparable to  the results  in  Table  3, with
Singaporean  firms having the highest  segmental complementarity,  and  Malaysian  firns
having the least segmental complementarity.
4.3 Diversification Discount
In calculating the diversification discount, we  adopt the approach of  Berger and
Ofek (1995) and extended by Lins  and Servaes (1997, 1998) and Fauver, Houston,  and
Naranjo (1998) to the international context.  This approach defines the excess value of the
diversification discount (EXV) as the ratio of the firm's actual value to its imputed value.
Market capitalization is used as the measure of actual firm value.  It is the market value of
common equity plus the book value of debt.  The imputed value is computed following the
12industry-matching scheme described in Section 4.1.  We first compute median market-to-
sales ratio for each industry in each country using only single-segment firms.  The market-
to-sales ratio is the market capitalization divided by firm sales.  We then multiply the level
of sales in each segment of a firmn  by its corresponding industry median market-to-sales
ratio.  The imputed value of the firmn  can be obtained by summing the multiples across all
segments.  We also  restrict the number of single-segment firmns  to  at least three when
computing the median market-to-sales ratio of an industry.  When an industry has fewer
than three  single-segment firns  even defined  broadly as Campbell  (1996), we  use the
median of all firrns in the country.
S. Regression  analysis
5.1 Relatedness  and short-termperformance
To  be  consistent  with  both  hypotheses, we  should  observe  a  differential  effect
between vertical and complementary diversification on EPM.  We test this proposition by
performing the following estimation:
EPM  = a + bi*V + b2*C + b3*SEGN + b4*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed effects) + u
where EPM  is the industry-adjusted excess profit margin,  V is  the vertical relatedness
measure, and C is the complementarity measure.  The explanatory variables also include
the number of firm segments (SEGN) and the natural logarithm of firm assets in thousands
of US dollars (Log(ASSETS)) to control for segment and size effects.  Lastly, we include
country and year dummy variables to  control for any fixed effects that may exist. The
regression is performed on the pooled sample of multi-segment firms as well as on country-
by-country samples.
[Table 5 here]
Table  5 presents  the regression  results.  In the  pooled  regression,  the  estimated
coefficients of the two relatedness variables V and C are both positive but only the latter is
statistically significant.  The result is largely driven by Japanese firms, which account for
12 Morck,  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1988) argue that firn size should be included  as a control variable  since the
size may be correlated  with value. In this study,  we control for the size effect because  the diversification
strategy  would  increase  the size of a firm,  which  increases  the inefficiency  of running  a bigger  corporation.
13more than two third of the sample. In the country-by-country  regressions, the estimated
coefficient  of  V  is  negative  in  all  countries  but  Japan.  The  negative  coefficients  are
significant for Indonesia (significant at the 10% level), Korea  (1%), Taiwan (5%),  and
Thailand (5%).  Vertical relatedness seems to hurt performance in these countries.  Japan is
the  only  country  whose  profitability  has  benefited  from  vertical  relatedness,  as  the
estimated coefficient of V is positive and significant at the 1-percent level.
In contrast, the estimated coefficient of C is positive in all but two countries, Hong
Kong and Japan. The positive coefficients are significant for Indonesia (5%), Korea (1%),
Taiwan (1%), and Thailand (1%).  Firm profitability in these countries has thus benefited
from complementary diversification.  Although the coefficients of C in the cases of Hong
Kong and Japan are negative, they are not statistically significant.
We next examine the effects of multiple  segments on  EPM. The coefficient  of
SEGN is negative and significant, suggesting that more segments hurt  firm profitability.
Across the nine countries, six countries exhibit negative segment effects and  five of the
coefficient  estimates  are  statistically significant.  The  Philippines  is  the  only  country
exhibiting significantly positive segment effect.  This result may be  driven by the small
sample size (35 firms). Lastly, there exist significant positive size effects on profitability
except  for Taiwan.  Large  firms  are  on average  more  profitable  than  small  firms,  as
indicated by the positive and highly significant coefficient of Log(ASSETS) in the pooled
regression. The country-by-country evidence is consistent with the pooled result.
To provide the statistical significance of the difference of impact between vertical
and  complementary  diversification  on  profit  margin,  we  test  whether  the  estimated
coefficients of V and C from the regressions are equal. As reported in Table 5, the F-value
is not significant for the pooled sample.  Across the nine countries, we find that the F-value
is  significant  in  five  countries:  Indonesia, Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan,  and  Thailand.  The
evidence for these four countries except for Japan is consistent with both hypotheses.  Note
that Japan is the only country whose profitability has benefited from vertical relatedness
and the estimated coefficient of V is significantly higher than that of C.  This evidence
indicates that  Japan  as  the  most  developed  country  in  East  Asia  may  already  utilize
sophisticated technologies and may also have peer firms to learn from.  Hence they have
benefited  from  vertical  diversification  more  than  from  complementary  diversification
14whose degree of required learning is low.  We are unable to test this proposition in this
section, however it clearly indicates that the degree of economic development matters in
testing these two competing hypotheses.  We will examine this issue in Section 6.
Note that if both vertical and complementary diversification have positive impact
on profitability, then it demonstrates that conglomerate diversification  hurts profitability
more  than  related  diversification.  However,  the  impact  between  vertical  and
complementary diversification on EPM should still be significantly different since vertical
diversification is more complex than complementary diversification. As we can see from
previous  tables,  vertical  integration  has  a  negative  impact  on  most  countries,  while
complementary expansion has a positive  impact on  almost all countries.  This  evidence
suggests that vertical integration is indeed associated with  a more complex  structure in
technology,  management  and  capital  investment  than  complementary  or  possibly
conglomerate diversification.
5.2 Relatedness  antd  diversification discount
The results in Section 5.1 show a significant differential effect for four countries
between  vertical and  complementary diversification.  To be  consistent with  the learning
hypothesis, the diversification discount should not be  affected by the degree  of vertical
diversification. In contrast, to be  consistent with  the misallocation-of-capital hypothesis,
the diversification discount should be negatively significant for vertical diversification. To
test these two hypotheses, we perform the following estimation:
EXV = a + bl*V + b2*C + b3*SEGN + b4*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed effects) + u
where EXV is the excess value of diversification discount, V is the vertical relatedness
measure, and C is the complementarity measure.  The explanatory variables also include
the number of firm segments (SEGN) and the natural logarithm of firm assets in thousands
of US dollar (Log(ASSETS)) to control for segment and size effects.  Lastly, we include
country and year dummy variables to control for any fixed effects that may exist.  The
regression is performed on the pooled sample of multi-segment firms as well as on country-
by-country samples.
Table  6 presents  the  regression results.  In  the pooled  regression,  the  estimated
coefficients of the two relatedness variables V and C  are both  positive  and statistically
15significant.  In  the  country-by-country  regressions,  the  estimated  coefficient  of  V  is
negative for only five countries.  The negative coefficients are significant only for Korea
(5%) and Malaysia (5%).  Japan is the only country whose EXV benefits from vertical
relatedness, as the estimated coefficient of V is positive and significant at the  I-percent
level. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of C is positive only  for four countries, and
significant only for Japan (1%), South Korea (5%) and Singapore (5%).
[Table 6 here]
We next  examine the  effects of multiple  segments on EPM.  The coefficient  of
SEGN is mixed.  Only Japan  exhibits a positive and significant  effect, while Malaysia
experiences a negative and  significant effect. Lastly, there exist significant positive size
effects on EXV except for Taiwan.  Large firms are on average more profitable than small
firms.  Note  that  these  two  variables  have  little  relevance  with  the  test  of  the  two
hypotheses.
We study separately the significance levels of V on EXV for  Indonesia, Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand since the results for EPM for these four countries are consistent with
both hypotheses. To be consistent with the learning hypothesis, the significant differential
effect  between  V  and  C  should  reduce  or  disappear.  As  documented  in  Table  6, the
statistical  significance of  the difference of impact between vertical  and  complementary
diversification on EXV is insignificant for three countries, Indonesia, Taiwan and Thailand.
In contrast, to be consistent with  the misallocation-of-capital hypothesis, the  significant
differential effect between V and C should remain,  as is the case for South Korea. As
documented in Table 6, the statistical significance of the difference of  impact between
vertical and complementary diversification on EXV is significant at the 5 % level for South
Korea.
The results  for  Malaysia  are  interesting.  In the  EPM regression,  the  effect  of
vertical diversification on EPM is negative but insignificant, while this variable becomes
significantly  negative  and  significantly  different  from  the  effect  of  complementary
diversification in the EXV regression.  We may argue that Malaysia is a relatively less
developed country in East Asia.  Its vertical integration may involve less complex layer of
technology, management and capital investment than in Korea or Taiwan, hence it may
impose less strain on short-term performance. However, Malaysia may have a more serious
16misallocation of capital problem, which  is reflected in  the EXV regression.  We hence
argue that the evidence is more consistent with the misallocation-of-capital hypothesis.
6. Diversification Effects and Economic Development
In this  section, we  study the two  competing hypotheses  by  examining the link
between diversification effects and the level of economic development of a country.  We
investigate whether the learning and capital misallocation problems  are sensitive to  the
degree of economic development of the country to which a finn belongs.
6.1 Thte  learniing-by-doinzg  htypothlesis
In previous section, using Japan as an example, we argued that learning-by-doing is
less costly for firms in more developed countries. Since vertical integration involves more
learning  than  complementary  diversification,  we  should  observe  that  firms  in  more
developed countries benefit more  from vertical  integration, because they already  utilize
sophisticated technologies and may have peer firms to learn from.  On the other hand, we
should  not  observe  such  performance  difference  for  complementary  diversification,
because the degree of required learning is low.
We  regress  EPM  and  EXV  on  diversification  variables  as  well  as  variables
proxying the level of economic development of each of the nine countries.  In the first
model specification, we use the average per-capita GNP'3 during  1991-96 (World Bank
(1996)) as the proxy for economic development. In an alternative specification, we proxy
the level of economic development by using the World Bank classification of countries by
income level groups.  This income grouping has been used in the studies of La Porta et al
(1998) and Fauver et al (1998).  As reported by the World Bank, the lower-middle income
dummy equals one if the firm is from Indonesia, the Philippines, or Thailand.  The high
income Dummy equals one if the firm is from Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore or Taiwan.
The numeraire is higher-middle income countries (Korea and Malaysia).  The results are
reported in Table 7.
[Table 7 here]
13We  divide the per-capita GNP by 1,000,000 in the regressions.
17Initially  focus  on  the  interactive  effects  of  vertical  relatedness  and  economic
development.  From columns (2) and (4), the interaction term between Per-Capita GNP and
vertical relatedness is positive and significant for both EPM and EXV.  From columns (I)
and  (3),  EPM  and  EXV  are positively  related  to  vertical  relatedness  in  high-income
countries while negatively (or insignificantly in the case of EXV) related to it in lower-
middle income countries.  These results suggest that firms in more developed countries are
successful in vertically  integrating with lower  costs to both  short-term profitability  and
market valuation, while this is not the case for firms in less-developed countries.  We have
found support for the learning-by-doing hypothesis.
From Table 7, we observe differential short- and  long-term interactive effects of
complementary diversification and economic development.  From column (2) and (4), the
coefficient of (Per-Capita GNP)xC is significantly negative for the' EPM regression but
significantly  positive  for  the  EXV  regression.  Using the  alternative  specification,  the
coefficients of  (Lower-income  dummy)xC and  (High-income  dummy)xC  in  the  EPM
regression  are significantly  positive  and  negative,  respectively  (column  (1)).  But  the
reverse is true in the EXV regression (column (4)).  From these results, it appears that in
the  short  run  firms  in  less  developed  countries  benefit  more  from  complementary
diversification relative to those  from more developed countries. It  is consistent with the
view that, relative to more developed countries, the less developed countries are less open
and less competitive, they have more opportunities for short-term profits.  But the firns  in
more developed countries are more likely to ultimately benefit  from such diversification.
This long-run result is consistent with the learning-by-doing hypothesis where firms in the
relatively more developed countries go faster up their learning curves and improve their
performance.
6.2 The misallocation-of-capital hypothesis
We next examine whether the firms'  diversification performance can be attributed
to misallocation of capital.  We focus on the effects of vertical diversification on both the
short-term and long-term performance.  From column (1) to column (4) of Table 7, the
estimated coefficients of V are negative and mostly significant, indicating the possibility of
misallocation of capital.  The coefficients of Per-Capita GNPxV in column (2) and (4) are
positive and significant, suggesting that diversification by firms in less developed countries
18are more subject to misallocation of capital. This evidence supports the finding by Shin and
Stulz (1996) that internal capital markets play a more significant role in less developed
countries,  however  internal capital markets  misallocate  capital.  To  assess  the role  of
capital misallocation on high-income and  low-income countries, we jointly  examine the
estimated coefficients of V and those of the interaction terms in the EXV regressions.  The
sum of the estimated coefficient of V and that of (High income dummy)xV is positive in
column (3).  On the other hand, the sum of the coefficient of V and that of (Lower-middle
income dummy)xV is negative in colume (3).  We do not find evidence of a pronounced
diversification discount for firns  in more developed countries, in support of the hypothesis
that capital misallocation is less relevant to such firms.
It  is  also  interesting  to  report  the  direct  effects  of  the  degree  of  economic
development  on diversification performance.  For both  measures  (EPM and  EXV), the
coefficient estimate on Per-Capita GNP is negative (columns (2) and (4)).  The dummy
variables  for income (columns (1) and (3)) tell a similar story: the lower-middle income
group dummy has a positive (and significant in column (1)) coefficient, while the high-
income group dummy is negative in both specifications, and significant in explaining EXV.
Diversified  firms  in  less developed  countries  perform better  relative  to  those  in more
developed countries.  The evidence is consistent with the view that external markets in less
developed  countries  are  more  subject  to  distortions,  hence  it  is  relatively  more  cost
effective for firms to allocate resources internally through diversification.  At the opposite,
more developed countries  are typically more open  and have a higher  degree of  market
competition.  That suggests less opportunity for excess profit margins and stock market
valuation.
7. Conclusions
This study tests the learning-by-doing and the misallocation-of-capital hypotheses
related  to  the  types  and  degree  of  diversification  in  East  Asian  countries.  Firms  in
Indonesia, Korea,  Taiwan  and  Thailand  appear to  have suffered  a  significant negative
impact of vertical integration on  short-term performance, while the same four countries
have gained significant short-term benefits from complementary expansion. This evidence
is  consistent  with  both  hypotheses.  However,  diversification  discounts  of  vertical
19diversification  remain  for  Korean  and  Malaysian  firms.  This  result  suggests  that  the
misallocation-of-capital  hypothesis  is  appropriate  for  Korea  and  Malaysia,  while  the
learning-by-doing hypothesis is more appropriate for Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand.
We  further  examine  these  two  hypotheses  by  examining  the  relation  between
diversification effects and the level of economic development of a country. We document
that firms in more developed countries are successful in vertically integrating with lower
costs to both short-term profitability and market valuation. We also document that firms in
more developed countries are more likely to ultimately benefit  from such diversification.
This  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  learning-by-doing hypothesis  that  firms  in  more
developed  countries  learn  faster  to  improve  their  performance.  Consistent  with  the
misallocation-of-capital  hypothesis,  we  document  that  diversification  by  firms  in  less
developed countries are more subject to misallocation of capital.
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23Table 1: Summary Statistics of Multi- and Single-Segmented Firms
The primary data source is Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan Company Handbook.  The sample spans the
period of 1991-1997. Firms with missing segment sales data are excluded.  Firms with their primary businesses
in financial services (SIC 6000-6999) are also excluded.  Company segments are defined at the two-digit SIC
code level.  Firms are classified as single-segment if at least 90 percent of their total sales are derived from one
two-digit SIC code segment.  The remaining firms are classified as multi-segment firms.
Multi-segment  Single-  I
firms  l  _  segment  firms
Number  Percentage  Average assets  Number  Percentage  Average assets
!I.  of total firms  (Millions  of US$)  of total firms  (Millions of US$)
Hong Kong  1  488  65  1199  256  34  974
Indonesia  117  47  670  133  53  391
Japan  6407  67  2850  3153  33  2250
Korea (South)  270  64  1556  152  36  2502
Malaysia  531  70  612  230  30  499
Philippines  38  33  489  76  67  455
Singapore  357  72  526  137  28  721
Taiwan  III  46  768  128  54  766
Thailand  31  27  578  360  73  261
All countries  8450  65  2371  4625  3_5  1776Table  2: Summary  Statistics  of Excess  Profitability  for Multi-  and Single-Segment  Firms
EPM  is the excess  profit margin  defined  as PM  - IPM, where  PM = 1-  (Costs  of goods sold)/Sales. IPM  is the imputed  profit margin. Using only single-segment  firnms,  we
compute  the median  profit margin  in each two-digit  SIC  code industry. The median  profit margin  of each segment  of a diversified  firm is multiplied  by the sales weight  of
the segment. The imputed  profit margin  is the sum of the sales-weighted  medians  across  all segments.  We subtract  IMP from PM to obtain  the industry-adjusted  profit
margin  EPM.
Mean EPM  Mean EPM  T-statistics for  Median EPM  Median EPM  Z-statistics for
Multi-segment firms Single-segment firms  Difference in means  Multi-segment firms  Single-segment  firms  Difference in
medians
Hong Kong  -0.0246  -0.0046  -1.52  -0.0269  -0.0030  -3.34
Indonesia  0.0433  0.0207  1.02  0.0151  0.0000  0.95
Japan  -0.0131  0.0093  -8.27  -0.0233  -0.0045  -8.58
Korea (South)  -0.0432  -0.0031  -3.27  -0.0460  -0.0063  -3.85
Malaysia  -0.0082  -0.0047  -0.26  -0.0208  0.0000  -2.54
Philippines  0.0898  0.0409  1.10  0.1526  0.0000  2.20
Singapore  -0.0625  0.0090  -4.19  -0.0653  0.0000  -5.37
Taiwan  -0.0109  0.0057  -0.87  -0.0316  -0.0012  -2.72
Thailand  -0.0275  0.0157  _  -2.42  -0.0330  0.0000  -1.68
All countries  -0.0153  0.0008  -9.61  -0.0251  -0.0021  -12.25Table 3:  Summary Statistics of Vertical Relatedness and Complementarity of Multi-Segment Firms
We rank multi-segment firms  by their relatedness levels, group the firms into ten percentiles, and compute mean relatedness measures for each of the ten percentiles.
The vertical relatedness and complementarity variables are constructed from the commodity flows data in the Use Table of the  1992 Benchmark U.S. Input-Output
Accounts.  The details of the variable definitions are described in the text.
Panel A: Vertical relatedness
Percentile  HongKong  Indonesia  I  Japan  IKorea(South)|  Malaysia  I  Philippines  I  Singapore  I  Taiwan  I  Thailand  All countries
0  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
10-  0.0010  0.0004  0.0007  0.0006  0.0010  0.0006  0.0013  0.0003  0.0010  0.0007
20  0.0019  0.0021  0.0014  - 0.0013  0.0016  0.0019  0.0024  0.0007  0.0023  0.0014
30  0.0034  0.0046  0.0020  0.0018  0.0024  0.0024  0.0033  0.0013  0.0062  0.0022
40  0.0055  0.0052  0.0030  0.0023  0.0035  0.00-37  0.0061  0.0020  0.0079  0.0033
50  0.0078  0.0082  0.0044  0.0037  0.0052  0.0079  0.0031  0.0096  0.0049
60  0.0117  0.0097  1  0.0065  0.0051  0.0076  0.0088  0.0102  0.0053  0.0131  0.0071
70  0.0175  0.0151  0.0090  0.0069  0.0111  0.0106  0.0172  0.0076  0.0276  0.0099
80  0.0302  0.0350  0.0148  0.0137  0.0168  0.0144  0.0301  0.0090  0.0357  0.0163
90  0.0486  0.0529  0.0326  0.0301  0.0400  0.0170  0.0493  0.0125  0.0697  0.0377
100  0.0824  0.0825  0.0879  0.0851  0.0825  0.0925  0.0746  0.0811  0.0977
Panel B: Complementarity
Percentile  [  Hong Kong  [ Indonesia  Japan  7Korea (South)I  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  |  Thailand  | All countries
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  I _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _~~  ~~____  _  I-  8_  _  __048  -_  _  __6  6  _  _  _  _00
0.0117  0.0129  0.0148  0.0248  -0.0005  10.0017  F  0.0637  0.039310.07161-0.0005
10  0.1175  0.0865  0.1482  0.0922  0.0760  0.1057  0.1298  0.0950  0.0997  0.1306
20  0.1860  0.1565  0.1947  0.1489  0.1031  0.1151  0.2099  0.1294  0.1706  0.1851-
30  0.2570  0.2205  0.2584  0.1868  0.1264  0.1522  0.2720  0.1516  0.2533  0.2416
40  0.3299  0.2355  0.3103  0 2429  0.1523  0.1776  0.3302  0.2057  0.3275  0.2946
50  0.3915 0.2722  0.3485  0.3009-  0.2091  - 0.1121  0.3991  -0.-2649  0.3560  0.3413
60  0.4357  0.4145  0  0.3919  0.3341  0.2616  0.2551  05.3546-  0.3988  0.3919
70  0.5751  0.6420  0.4271  0.3825  0.3276  0.2994  0.6318  0.3904  }  0.4520  0.4283
80  0.6457  0.9489  0.5311  0.4095  0.4254-  0.5626  10.7391  - 0.4276 -{  0.6420-  0.5375
90  0;9720-  1.3655  07539  -04330  0.6287  0.8951  1  1.0070  1  .2886  -0.9082  0.7908
L  100  2.2.0000  2.0000  000 00  2.0000  1  2.0000  1.2744  2.0000-  2.0000  1.4190  2.0000Table  4: Distribution  of Multi-Segment  Firms  by Relatedness  and Complementarity
The table  reports  for each  country the distribution  of firms in number  and in cumulative  percentage  across  ten relatedness  levels. Panel  A an 
B report numbers  and cumulative percentages  by vertical relatedness  (V).  Panel  C and D report numbers  and cumulative percentages  b~
complementarity  (C).  The vertical relatedness  and complementarity  variables  are  constructed  from the commodity flows data in the Us
Table  of the 1992  Benchmark  U.S.  Input-Output  Accounts. The  details of the variable  definition are  described  in the text.
Panel  A: Number  of firms by vertical relatedness
All countries Hong Kong  Indonesia  Korea  T Japan  Malaysia  Philippines Singaporc  Taiwan  Thailand
____________________________________  __________________________  __________________________  S  o t )  ___________(S  o u th )_____________________________
V  <0.01  5298  26  5  1221  4170  336  23  208  58  56
0.0lI<-V  <0.02  1068  87  14  14  789  78  1  1  51  8  16
0.02<-=V  <0.03  271  324  8  175  22  - 021  0  9
0.03  - V  <0.04  226  27  5  5  136  2019  014
0.04- V  <  0.5  174  f  24  5  0  - lI  1  6D  0  1  7  0  2
0.05 - V <0.06  229  16  6  3  173  2070  0
0.06<=  V <0.07  110  91  2  8 
0.07  -=V <0.08  154  20  5  5  94  7  3I  9
0.08 <= V <0.09  32  I  I  1  19q  3  2  4  0 
0.09<=V  ~~~~~5  0  0  040  00
Panel  B: Cumulative percentage of firnms  by vertical relatedniess
V <0.0l  0.70  0.54  0.61  0.76  0.72  0.66  0.63  0.59  0.86  0.50
0.01  -~ V < 0.02  0.84  0.72  0.74  08  .6  08  .4  07  .8  06
0.02 <=  V < 0.03  0.87  0.79  07  0.90  -0.899  08094  .80  0.8  .7
F0.03  <-  V <~O0.04  0.90  0.85  0,83  0.9.3  (191  .89  0-.94  0.5  09  O.896
0.04  -= V < 0.05  0.92  0.0  08  .3-  (9  .3  0.94  0.90  0.98  0.88
0.05 <= V < 0.06  0.96  03  0.3  0.95  1.6  09  .4  09  .8  08
0.06 <=V < 007  0.97  0.95  0.9  . 096  0.97  0.98  0.94  0.94  0.98  0.(90
0.07 <= V < 0.08  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.94  0.98  1.00  0.99
0.08 <= V < 0.09  0.99  1.00  1.00  I  .00  0.99  1.00  1.00  0.99  I 00  1.00
0.09  -=V  1.00  I1.0  _1.01)__  .00_.00  1.00  00-1-6  T.00  1.00  1.00  1-.00o
--  - '~~~~~Iand  C: Numbrof  frms  hy conmplenentarOty  -_  --  -
C <0.l  404  28  13  17  217  93  -.  2  15  8  1  I
0.1 <=C <0_.2  1_l356  . . .- 5  I  37--  982-  1216  52  18  13-
0.2  <~~~C<0.3  1312  ~~73  34  --  24-  13  808  54  10  16
0.3  <=  C <0.4  ~1624  73 - 5  ---  - 45S----  138_  67  1  55  1l3  -27-
0.4  <~  C  <~75  1150)  64  5  _26  970  37  - 1  _26  8-  _1-3
O65_<=zC:O.6  . 412  360  2  I  3  12  2  2  2  3  2  14
0_.6<=--C<~0.7  . 384  511  7  3  257  20I37  1  - 8
07<C08  . 184  1I  3  1  1  37  10  0  - 1  9  0  4
0.8<=C<0.9  ~~~99  1  I3I  63  7  2  7  1  2
0. g-  <.  64  56  (123  _66  19-  53  7  12
Pnl'C  D): (umu11LlativC  per-cenitage  of tirnis by  complementarity
C < 0.1  1  0.  O05  0.2  (1.1(  0.03  0.18  0.05  0.04  0.11  0.10
071  =C<  0.2  (1.23  (0.21  11.22  1)33_  02  0.8  0.50  0.19  - 0.38  0.21
0.2 <=  ('1.3  11.41)  0.310  10.54  0.  48  0.3  0.64  0.72  0.34  0.53  0.36
0.3 <=  (01.4  11.02  (0.52  01.59  0.76--  0_._61  0(177  0.75  0.50  0.73  0.60
0.4  <  O.  <05  01,77  11.65  0,64  (1.93  0.78  0.84  0.77  0.57  0.85  0.72 -
05=(< 0.6  11.82  (1.73  0.06  01)3  0-.8 3  0.88  0.83  0.66  0.86  0.76-
0.  <  o  1.7  (1.87  (1.83  11.72  .-. 95-  0.988  0.92  0.86  0-6.77  0.88  0.83
07<  C  0.  8  (1.9  (1.85  (1.75  0.96  0.90  0.94  0.86  0.82  0.88  0.87
0.8  <=  ('<0.9  11.'91  11.88  (1.78  0-.9  0.91  0.96  0.91  0.84  0.89  0.89
0709<=  C  .)1.  111  .0  10  .00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00Table 5:  OLS Regressions of Excess Profitability on Relatedness  and Complementarity
This table reports the OLS regression results of the following regression model: EPM = a + b,*V  + b2*C + b3*SEGN + b4*Log(ASSETS)  + (Fixed effects) + u, where EPM is
the excess profitability measure, V is the vertical relatedness measure, C is the complementarity  measure, SEGN is the number of segments,  and Log(ASSETS)  is the natural
logarithm of firm assets in thousands of US dollar.  The polled regression controls for fixed effects by including country  and year dummy variables  (not reported).  EPM = PM
- IPM, where PM = I - (Costs of goods sold)/Sales.  IPM is the imputed profitability  measure.  Using only single-segment  firms, we compute the median profitability  measure
in each two-digit SIC code industry.  The median profitability  measure of each segment of a diversified  firm is multiplied  by the sales weight of the segment.  The imputed
profitability  measure  is the  sum  of  the sales-weighted  medians  across  all segments.  The  vertical relatedness  and  complementarity  variables  are  constructed  from  the
commodity flows data in the Use Table of the 1992 U.S. Input-Output Accounts.
Dependent variable: EPM
|Allcountries  Hong Kong  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  i  Taiwan  Thailand
Intercept  -0.5135  -0;3751***  -0.1398  -00599***  0.0187  -0.2657***  0.2119  -0.3323***  0.6943***  -0.2661
_  (-0.830) _  (-5.375)  (-0.695)  (-3.979)  (0.165)  (-3.642)  (0.577)  (-3.554)  (2.675)  (-1.332)
Verticalrelatedness  l  0.1154  -0.2470  r  i.8746*  0.4788***  1.4989***  -0.4626  -1.7029  -0.2253  |4.8110**  |2.0914**
(V)  (1.228)  (-0.644)  (-1.974)  (4.739)  (-2.820)  (-0.958)  (-0.903)  (-0.489)  __(-2.362)  (-2.369)
Complementarity  |  0.0087*  l  -0.0177  r 0.0789**|  -0.0066  l  0.1291***  l  0.0432  l  0.1349  |  0.0302  .1947***  l0.1791***
(C)  (1.949)  (-0.886)  (1.984)  (-1.447)  (2.901)  (1.604)  (1.272)  (1.080)  (4  )  (2754)
Number  of segments  -0.0176***  0.0374***  0.0190  l0.0173***  -0.0120  0.0289***  0.0530**  l_0.0250***  l0.0384*  0.0321
(SEGN)  (-12.900)  (4)  (-0.968)  (-5.388)  (2.177)  <  (-3.) 9(1  708)  (1.564)
Log(ASSETS)  0.0103***  0.0395***  |  0.0092  0.0075***  -0.0041  0.0293***  -0.0260  |  0.0285***  -0.0494**  |0.0102
f  (9.554) 1  (6.914)  t  (0.619)  (7.131)  (-0.565)  (4.567)  (-0.885)  (3.606)  -- (--2.437)  (0.619)
_.  042  - 6.  01  _T  _  058  . .1.9_
Adjusted R-square  0.0471  0.1177  0.0432  |  0.0311  - 0.0583  0.0657  00398  366  0.1365
Observations  1  7489  466  106  5726  1 47  492  35  l  342  t  67  108
Fvaluefor  V=C  l1.2497  l  0.3478  l  4.1741  f22.3926  8.84101  1.0599  50.9314  0.2975  59752  6.4084
Probability>F  |  0.2637  |  0.5556  |  0.0437  - 0.0001<  0.0035  |  0.3037  l  0.3422  |  0.5858  1  0 0174  |  0.0129 263 _  _  _  __Table  6: OLS Regressions of Excess Value  on Relatedness
This table reports  the OLS regression  results  of the following regression model: EXV = a  + b1*V + b2*C + b3*SEGN + b4*Log(ASSETS)  +  (Fixed
effects)  + u.  The dependent  variable,  EXV,  is the excess value  defined as the ratio  of  a firm's  actual  value  to its  imputed  value.  Details  of the
variable construction  can be  found in the  text  and also  in Berger  and Ofek (1995) and  Lins  and  Servaes  (1996,  1997).  Among the  independent
variables,  V is  the  vertical relatedness  measure,  C is the complementarity  measure,  SEGN  is the  number  of  segments,  and Log(ASSETS)  is the
natural logarithm  of firm assets  in thousands  of US dollar.  The polled regression controls  for fixed  effects  by including  country  and  year  dummy
variables (not  reported).  The  vertical relatedness  and complementarity variables are constructed  from  the  commodity flows data in the  Use Table  o
the 1992 Benchmark  U.S. Input-Output  Accounts.  The details of the variable definition are  described  in the  text.
Dependent variable:  All  countries  Hong  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Nlalaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand
EXV  Kong
LI:ntercept  I1.  1088***  -0.28931  -1.0173  0.7555***  1.5531**  1.5347***  -1.4029  1.1905***  3.1165**  1.9956**
=___  ________  (3.3011)  1  (-0.796)  (-1.101)  (9.582)  (2.362)  (3.749)  (-1.106)  (3538)  (2.773)  (2.341)
_  _  _  _  _  _  1  _  _  13  311_  _  _  _  06  _3  _38
IVerticai relateldness  2  1.2863*  j 2.(i361  -3.0572  2.1913***  -7.2571**  -6.8400***  7.9937  -0.3712  1.3894  -4.9497
(V)  l(2.685)  1  (l._03!  (-0.594)  1  (4.108)  (-2.356)-  (-2.615)  (1.307)  (-0.217)  (0.074)  (-1.188)
Complementarity  0.4)715***  -0.0559  -0.1563  0.0896***  0.7830**  -0.1372  0.7  12  0.2217**  -0.0221  -0.3463
(C)  -(3.182)  (-O.5734  (-0.866)  13.79)  (2.332)  I (-0.944)  (1.563)  (2.227)  (-0.109)  (-1.198)
rofsegmnents  0-0174**  '0.0445  -0.0354  O-0357***  0.0014  -0 0652**  0.0533  -0.0262  -0.0388  -0.0364
(SEGN)  (2.548)  (-1.419)  (-0.401)  (4.682)  (0.020)  (-2.238)  (0.647)  (-0.895)  (-0.445)  (-0.345)
Log(ASSETS)  g  0-0135**  10.1340**0.2028  01  -0.04861  0.0097  0.1689  -0.0158  -0.1488*  -0.0318
(2.501)  (4.471)  (2.929)  (2.139)  (-1.150)  (0.273)  (1.634)  (-0.550)  (-1.697)  (-0.450)
Adjusted R-square  0.0136  0.0397  0.0788  0.0128  0.0434  0182  01187  1  0.0092  -0.0026  -0.0011
Observations  |  7127  402  93  5550  133  455  30  315  |  57  92
I _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  r  _
IF value for V=-C  1 6.2388  1.0958  0.3127  15.0572  6.3856  6.3498  1.3705  0.1170  0.0057  1.1915
|Probability>F  l  0.0125  0.2958  0.5775  0.0001  0.0127  |0,.0121  0.2528  0.7325  0.9403  0.2781
Note:  t-statistics  in parentheses;  Asterisks  denote  the level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%,  *  10%.Table  7! Diversification  Effectg  and Eeonomic  Development
Excess profit margin (EPM) and excess value (EXV) are employed as the dependent variable in Equations (1) and (2),
and (3) and (4), respectively.  GNP is the annual per-capita  GNP in US dollars  divided by 1,000,000.  The Lower-
Middle Income Dummy equals one if the firm is from Indonesia, Philippines,  or Thailand.  The High Income Dummy
equals one if the firm is from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,  or Japan.  The numeraire  is Higher-Middle Income
countries (Korea and Malaysia). The income groups are assigned according to World Bank.  V and C are the vertical
relatedness and the complementarity measures,  respectively.  SEGN is the number of firm segments.  Log(assets) is
the natural logarithm of firm assets in thousands of US dollars.  The sample includes multi-segment firms in the nine
Asian  countries.  In  Equations (3)  and (4),  firms with excess  values greater  than  four or less  than one-fourth  are
deleted.
Dependent variable  EPM  EXV
(1)  (2)  (3)  r  (4)
Intercept  -0.051  }  -0.0544  1.5214***  [  1.4959***
(-0.840)  (-0.883)  (4.545)  (4.485)
Per-capita  GNP  -O.1-60  9.7390""'
(-0.683)  (-7.826)
Lower-Middle Income Dummy  0.0269*  0.1119
(1.681)  (1.356)
High Income Dummy  -0.0024  -0.2612***
(-0.289)  (-5.898)
Vertical Relatedness (V)  -0.4035  -1.4980***  -4.3809***  -3.4311***  l
(-1.251)  (-5.964)  (-2.692)  (-2.583)
Complementarity (C)  0.0536***  0.0976***  -0.0870  -0.1220*
(2.660)  (7.245)  (-0.835)  (-1.756)
Number of firm segments (SEGN)  -0.0176***  -0.0184***  0.0180***  0.0152**
(-13,001)  (-13,32)  (2.665)  (2,249) 
Log (assets)  0.0106***  0.0109***  0.0124**  0.0149***
(10.122)  (10.216)  (2.345)  (2.778)  ;
Per-Capita GNP x V  n.a.  59.9630***  n.a.  17.6224***
(6.828)  (3.827)
Per-Capita GNP x C  n.a.  -3.2240***  n.a.  6.6650***
(-7.088)  (2.858)
Lower-Middle  Income Dummy x V  -1.9974***  n.a.  1.9199  n.a.
(-3.940)  (0.705)
High Income Dumry  x V  0.7115**  n.a.  6.5049***  n.a.
(2.105)  (3.813)
Lower-Middle Income Dummy x C  0.0778***  n.a.  -0.1240  n.a.
(2.706)  (-0.832)
ligh Income Dummy x C  AOS5P"  n.a.  0.1755*k  n.a.
(-2.681)  (1.643)
Adjusted R-square  0.0448  0.0428  0.0132  0.0136
Observations  7489  7489  7127  7127
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses; Asterisks denote the level of significance:  ***  1%, ** 5%, *  10%.Policy Research  Working Paper  Series
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